A. Introduction
Illicit drug cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption flourish in Afghanistan, particularly in parts of the south and southwest where instability is high and state institutions are weak or non-existent. More
than 90 percent of poppy cultivation takes place in these regions. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) estimate that Afghanistan cultivated 209,000 hectares (ha) of opium poppy in 2013, with a total yield of 5,500 metric tons (MT) of raw opium. This was a 36 percent increase in cultivation and a 49 percent increase in opium production from 2012. The United States government estimates that in 2013, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased 10 percent to 198,000 ha, while potential opium production increased 28 percent to 5,500 MT. A symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. Traffickers provide weapons, funding, and other material support to the insurgency in exchange for the protection of drug trade routes, fields, laboratories, and their organizations. Some insurgent commanders engage directly in drug trafficking to finance their operations. The narcotics trade undermines governance and rule of law in all parts of the country where poppy is cultivated and traffickers operate.
Afghanistan is involved in the full narcotics production cycle, from cultivation to finished heroin to consumption. Drug traffickers trade in all forms of opiates, including unrefined opium, semi-refined morphine base, and refined heroin. Some raw opium and morphine base is trafficked to neighboring and regional countries, where it is further refined into heroin. While the vast majority of the opium and heroin produced in Afghanistan is exported, Afghanistan is also struggling to respond to a burgeoning domestic opiate addiction problem.
Afghanistan relies on assistance from the international community to implement its national counternarcotics strategy. Greater political will, increased institutional capacity, enhanced security, viable economic alternatives for farmers, and more robust efforts at all levels are required to decrease cultivation in high-cultivating provinces, maintain cultivation reductions in the rest of the country, and combat trafficking.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Government of Afghanistan is publicly committed to confronting the drug problem in Afghanistan, particularly focusing on what it identifies as the root causes of the drug economy including instability; poverty; unemployment; and organized crime. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is the lead governmental agency for developing counternarcotics policy and coordinates the activities of other governmental bodies involved in issues related to the drug trade. The Afghan government approved the new Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) in October 2013. MCN is also working to insert counternarcotics into the activities of the entire government by “mainstreaming” counternarcotics efforts into other existing national strategies and programs.
Afghanistan has no formal extradition or mutual legal assistance arrangements with the United States. Afghanistan is a signatory to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the 2005 Afghan Counter Narcotics Law allows for the extradition of drug offenders to requesting countries under the 1988 UN Drug Convention. A 2013 domestic Afghan extradition law adds additional hurdles to any potential extradition process.
2. Supply Reduction
According to UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan cultivated 209,000 ha of opium poppy in 2013, up 36 percent from 2012. UNODC and MCN estimate that Afghan opium poppy crops in 2013 yielded 5,500 MT of raw opium, up 49 percent from 3,700 MT in 2012, a year in which yields were suppressed by unfavorable growing conditions. According to the UNODC and MCN, the number of poppy free provinces (those provinces with less than 100 ha of poppy under cultivation) decreased from 17 in 2012 to 15 in 2013 (out of a total of 34 provinces).
There is significant evidence of commercial cultivation of cannabis in Afghanistan. The UNODC and MCN’s 2012 cannabis survey found that commercial cannabis cultivation in 2012 was approximately 10,000 ha, capable of producing 1,400 MT of hashish per year. The 2012 survey did not assess the number of households growing cannabis for commercial purposes, but a 2011 survey estimated that the number of cannabis producing households increased by 38 percent (65,000 households) from 2010. As with poppy, most cannabis cultivation takes place in insecure areas of the country.
Primary trafficking routes into and out of Afghanistan are through Pakistan and Iran to the Balkans, Turkey and Western Europe; through Pakistan to Africa, Asia, the Middle East, China and Iran; and through Central Asia to the Russian Federation. The United States is not a common destination for Afghan opiates. Drug laboratories within Afghanistan still process a large portion of the country’s raw opium into heroin and morphine base. Traffickers illicitly import large quantities of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan; UNODC estimates that 475 MT of acetic anhydride are imported annually for manufacturing heroin.
MCN implements the U.S.-funded Good Performers Initiative (GPI) to reward provinces that successfully reduce poppy cultivation within their borders. Provinces that are determined to be poppy-free by UNODC, or where poppy cultivation has declined by 10 percent or more, receive funding for development projects proposed by provincial development councils and governors’ offices. In 2012, 21 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces received $18.2 million in GPI awards, including two provinces that received special recognition awards of $500,000 each. The MCN-run Governor-Led Eradication program reimburses governors for expenses incurred for eradicating poppy fields. Eradication is verified by UNODC. In 2013, a total of 7,348 ha was eradicated, a decrease of 24 percent compared to 2012. Both the quality and efficiency of eradication improved in certain provinces, but attacks by criminals and insurgents on eradication teams resulted in 143 deaths on both sides in 2013, including civilians and security personnel. An additional 93 people were injured in such attacks.
The Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) is a vetted, self-contained unit that consists of investigators, prosecutors, and first instance and appellate court judges. Under Afghanistan’s 2005 Counternarcotics Law, amended in 2010, the CJTF prosecutes all drug cases that reach certain thresholds (possession of two kilogram of heroin, 10 kilograms of opium or 50 kilograms of hashish or precursor chemicals) before the Counter Narcotics Tribunal. The Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) houses the Tribunal and CJTF, and is the central facility for the investigation, prosecution, and trial of major narcotics and narcotics-related corruption cases. The CNJC is considered a model of excellence within the Afghan justice system. Between March 2012 and March 2013, the CNJC primary court heard 551 cases and tried 704 suspects, involving more than 233 MT of illegal drugs (a 26 percent increase in the volume of drugs over the previous year). Those convicted receive sentences ranging from 11 to 20 years.
Afghan authorities have increasingly used their specialized counternarcotics units and the CNJC to arrest and prosecute high-value traffickers, including the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of Nimruz Provincial Police Chief Mohammad Kabir Andarabi in 2013. Andarabi was arrested on narcotics trafficking charges and sentenced to 10 years. According to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) figures, during the first nine months of 2013, specialized units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) conducted a total of 78 counternarcotics operations and seized 27.5 MT of opium, 16.7 MT of morphine, and 284 kilograms of heroin. The CNPA was established in 2003 as a specialized element of the Afghan National Police and is responsible for counternarcotics investigations and operations. The United States supports several specialized units within the CNPA, including the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), the Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU). These units are partnered with the DEA. The NIU is the tactical element of the CNPA and is capable of conducting independent, evidence-based interdiction operations and seizures in high threat environments. The TIU and SIU are specially vetted and trained law enforcement units. The SIU carries out complex CN and counter corruption investigations using intelligence developed by the TIU.
U.S. assistance has also supported the development of a viable command and control structure at the Afghan Customs Police, with specialized training and operational support provided by the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection. These efforts, channeled through the Afghan government’s Border Management Task Force, led to a 31 percent increase in narcotics seizures at border checkpoints over 2012.
Outside these special units, limited capacity and corruption within law enforcement institutions and the lack of CNPA’s direct authority over its resources in the provinces hampers counternarcotics efforts.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction and Treatment
The Afghan government acknowledges a growing domestic drug abuse problem, primarily involving opiates and cannabis. Funded by the United States, the Afghan National Urban Drug Use Survey released in 2012 provides a scientifically-valid prevalence rate for the country’s urban population based on interviews and toxicology. The survey conservatively estimated that Afghanistan is home to 1.3 to 1.6 million drug users, one of the world’s highest per capita rates. The United States is supporting a National Rural Drug Use Survey to complement the urban study and provide a national prevalence rate. Other recently conducted studies indicate that the prevalence of addiction and severity of consumption among Afghan children is the highest documented in the world.
The United States expanded funding to 76 inpatient and outpatient drug treatment centers across the country in 2013. Unfortunately, the demand for services exceeds the capacity of the centers, most of which have waiting lists for new patients. The United States also supports UNODC’s global child addiction program throughout Afghanistan to develop protocols for treating opiate-addicted children, training treatment staff, and delivering services through Afghan non-governmental organizations. The current annual treatment capacity of Afghanistan’s centers is more than 15,000 persons. The Government of Afghanistan is planning an expansion of its treatment system by opening new clinics across the country. Private clinics have also proliferated in recent years, although many of these do not apply evidence-based practices, discharging clients after detoxification without follow-up, thereby resulting in high relapse rates.
The United States funds a Counter Narcotics Community Engagement program (CNCE). This multi-track annual communication and outreach campaign, implemented by Sayara Strategies, aims to ensure a smooth transition of activities to the Afghan government through systematic capacity development efforts. The program focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. The United States has undertaken a vigorous public information campaign implemented by Colombo Plan, to reduce drug demand inside Afghanistan, including seeking the support of subject-matter experts and school teachers; engaging local media; and implementing an anti-drug curriculum in Afghan schools. In 2012, the U.S. government helped establish a partnership between the Colombo Plan’s Preventive Drug Education program and the Afghan Premier Soccer League to spread an anti-drug message to Afghan youth. The United States also funds an Afghanistan-specific mobile preventive drug education exhibit.
4. Corruption
As a matter of government policy, the Government of Afghanistan does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering proceeds from the sale of illicit drugs. However, many central, provincial, and district level government officials are believed to directly engage in and benefit from the drug trade. Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to benefiting from drug trade revenue streams. The CJTF actively investigates and prosecutes public officials who facilitate drug trafficking under Article 21 of the Counter Narcotics Law, which criminalizes drug trafficking-related corruption. The CJTF has successfully prosecuted high ranking government officials, including members of the CNPA. According to Afghan officials, between March 2012 and March 2013, 21 public officials were prosecuted in the CJTF primary court.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The U.S. government maintains a counternarcotics strategy that supports Afghanistan’s four counternarcotics priorities: disrupting the drug trade; developing licit agricultural livelihoods; reducing the demand for drugs; and building the capacity of the government’s CN institutions. The strategy is formulated to help restore Afghanistan’s licit agriculture economy, build Afghan institutional capacity, and disrupt the nexus among drugs, insurgents, and corruption.
In 2012, the United States signed agreements with the Afghan government laying the groundwork for a Kandahar Food Zone in 2013. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Counternarcotics, the Kandahar Food Zone was developed as a comprehensive, multi-pillar drug-control program that integrates elements of alternative development, law enforcement and eradication, public information and drug treatment. In July 2013, the United States awarded a $20 million, two-year program to develop the Alternative Livelihoods component of the Kandahar Food Zone. MCN has established a coordination mechanism to integrate alternative livelihoods activities with U.S.-funded Counter Narcotics Public Information, Drug Demand Reduction, and Governor-Led Eradication programs.
The estimated value of opium to the Afghan economy has remained relatively stable over the last decade. Yet Afghanistan’s legal economy has grown steadily, and as a result, opiates now make up a much smaller fraction of Afghanistan’s economy – from 60 percent of the GDP in 2003 to 10 percent in 2012.
D. Conclusion
For Afghanistan to enjoy future success in combating the narcotics trade it must continue to strengthen the capacity of the MCN and other ministries charged with conducting or supporting counternarcotics efforts, actively combat corruption at all levels of government, and further develop the ability of regular CNPA units to carry out operations. The Afghan government must also demonstrate the political will to challenge vested political and economic interests.
Farmers and those involved in processing and trafficking drugs must also have viable economic alternatives to involvement in the narcotics trade. Improvements in security and market access, as well as continued concentrated efforts to increase agricultural and other alternative livelihoods, will remain essential to undermining the drug economy and the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Sweden’s former Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has admitted that he helped an Afghan student escape from Kabul in 2009 by sneaking him on to a Swedish government plane.
a key role in former Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt’s government – had been involved in a “secret mission” that took place under cover of darkness” to help the student who had been sentenced to death in Afghanistan.Secret mission unknown in Sweden: In 2009, Carl Bildt @carlbildt flew Afghan student sentenced to death from Kabul under cover of darkness
— Kai Eide (@kai_eide) January 21, 2015
Great media interest in Sweden in tweet by @kai_eide on rescuing student in Afghanistan in 2009.http://t.co/c60OAS2qv2
— Carl Bildt (@carlbildt) January 22, 2015
